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Abstract:  The  judgment  under  study  (ECJ  -  judgment  of  September  12, 
2006, Spain/United Kingdom, C-145/04) concerns the controversy between 
Spain and the United Kingdom on the sovereignty of Gibraltar and affects the 
legal status of Gibraltar in the European Union. The point of departure for 
this study stems from the adoption by the United Kingdom of the European 
Parliament (Representation) Act –EPRA 2003, in order to comply with the 
judgment of the ECHR in the case of Matthews vs UK, 1999. Spain points out 
that its action covers solely elections as they are held in Gibraltar and not 
the United Kingdom’s recognition of the right to the so-called Qualifying 
Commonwealth  Citizens  (QCCs)  residing  in  its  territory  to  vote  for  the 
European Parliament. The ECJ dismissed the action of Spain. In our opinion, 
a  Spanish  argument  focused  on  the  limitations  of  the  annex  I  of  the  Act 
concerning the election of the representatives of the European Parliament by 
direct  universal  suffrage  (1976)  would  have  been  able  to  direct  the 
arguments of the parties and the foundations of the ECJ to a different ending. 
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I. Introduction 
Gibraltar  holds  an  unusual  position 
within the European Community/European 
Union (EC/EU), being a non-autonomous 
territory  that  is  dependent  on  a  Member 
State,  the  United  Kingdom.  It  is  also  
well-known that a controversy has existed 
between  Spain  and  the  UK  concerning 
Gibraltar as a territory that is under British 
sovereignty since the Treaty of Utrecht in 
1713, and that nowadays it is the subject of 
negotiations between the two nations with 
respect  to  the  United  Nations 
decolonisation process.   
The  unusual  idea  of  Gibraltar  as  a  
non-autonomous  territory  meant  that  the 
United  Kingdom  initially  excluded 
Gibraltar  from  the  European  elections, 
according to the terms of Appendix II of 
the Act relating to the election of Members 
of  the  European  Parliament  by  direct 
universal suffrage [1] (hereafter, the 1976 
Act). 
Two judgments by European courts have 
examined  this  situation  from  different 
perspectives, leading to regulatory reforms 
that have changed this political and legal 
scene,  while  creating  a  regulatory 
framework  that  is  the  subject  of  judicial 
controversy. In fact, the judicial decisions 
made  by  these  European  courts  have 
allowed  Gibraltar  to  take  part  in  the 
European  Parliament  (EP)  elections  in 
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Thus,  on  the  one  hand  we  have  the 
Matthews judgment of the European Court 
of Human Rights in Strasbourg [2]; and on 
the other hand, the Spain/United Kingdom 
judgment of the European Court of Justice 
(ECJ) in Luxembourg [3]. 
On the 4th June 2009 Gibraltar took part 
for  the  second  time  in  the  European 
Parliament elections, included in the region 
of  South  West  England.  This  change 
follows  the  proceedings  of  the  British 
legislator in compliance with the Matthews 
judgment of the European Court of Human 
Rights in 1999, as a result of the appeal 
made against the United Kingdom by Mrs 
Matthews, of British nationality residing in 
Gibraltar.  In this judgment, the European 
Court of Human Rights declared that the 
United Kingdom had infringed article 3 of 
the  first  Protocol  of  the  European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), by 
not having organised European Parliament 
elections in Gibraltar [4].  
Consequently,  in  order  to  guarantee 
compliance  of  the  European  Court  of 
Human Rights’ judgment in the Matthews 
case,  and  faced  with  Spain’s  refusal  to 
withdraw annex II of the 1976 Act [5], the 
United  Kingdom  issued  a  Declaration  in 
which  it  assured  that  it  would  make  it 
possible for the Gibraltarian electorate to 
vote in the European Parliament elections 
as  part  of  a  constituency  of  the  United 
Kingdom [6]. This Declaration, on the 18th 
February  2002,  included  the  agreement 
reached  between  Spain  and  the  United 
Kingdom,  of  which  the  Council  and  the 
Commission took note [7]. 
On  the  8
th  May  2003,  the  United 
Kingdom adopted the European Parliament 
(Representation)  Act  2003  (hereafter 
EPRA 2003), with the aim of guaranteeing 
the right of the Gibraltarians to participate 
in the European elections. 
This study aims to analyse the judgment 
pronounced  by  the  European  Court  of 
Justice in 2006 with respect to an appeal 
made  by  Spain  against  this  British  Act 
relating  to  the  European  Parliament 
elections  in  Gibraltar,  determined  by  the 
Spanish-British  agreements  of  the 
Declaration of 2002. 
 
2.  Appeal  Made  before  the  European 
Court of Justice by Spain against the 
United  Kingdom  Due  to  Failure  to 
Comply with the Law 
The  Act  relating  to  electoral 
representation for the European Parliament 
elections (EPRA 2003) formed a basis for 
the appeal made by Spain against the UK 
in March 2004, due to failure to comply 
with EU law [8], in accordance with article 
227  of  the  Treaty  of  the  European 
Community.  
Focusing on the analysis of the judgment 
of the ECJ on the 12th September 2006, 
Spain  considered  that  the  EPRA  2003 
violated  the  Treaty  of  the  European 
Community and the 1976 Act, and that the 
United  Kingdom  had  not  respected  the 
commitments it made in the Declaration of 
the 18th February 2002.  
The  declarations  presented  by  Spain  in 
the  appeal  against  the  United  Kingdom 
focused on two specific aspects:   
Firstly, on the way in which the United 
Kingdom  has  organised  the  European 
Parliament  elections  in  Gibraltar  [9], 
giving the right to vote to nationals from 
other  countries  that  are  not  EU  citizens.  
This is the case of Commonwealth citizens 
that fulfil certain requirements (known as 
Qualifying  Commonwealth  Citizens  or 
QCC [10]) and that reside in Gibraltar. For 
Spain  this  is  a  violation  of  EU  law, 
upholding  that  a  clear  relationship  exists 
between  EU  citizenship  and  the  right  to 
active and passive suffrage in the European 
elections. 
Secondly,  on  the  incorporation  of  the 
territory  of  Gibraltar,  and  not  the 
Gibraltarian electorate, in the constituency 
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according to Spain, the 1976 Act, whose 
Annex I (in the current version) obliges the 
United  Kingdom  to  only  apply  the 
corresponding  regulations  within  its  own 
territory, consequently excluding Gibraltar.  
Spain likewise considers this to be a clear 
breach  of  the  commitments  made  by  the 
United  Kingdom  in  its  Declaration  in 
2002.   
 
3. EU Citizenship and the Right to Vote 
in European Parliament Elections  
If we focus on the first plea in law, the 
following arguments are those upon which 
the  Spanish  government  based  its  appeal 
that the EPRA 2003 was contrary to EU 
law as a result of giving the QCCs resident 
in  Gibraltar  the  right  to  vote  in  the 
European  elections:  Spain  declares  that 
articles 17, 19, 189 and 190 of the Treaty 
of  the  European  Community,  interpreted 
historically  and  methodically,  only 
recognise  the  right  to  active  and  passive 
suffrage  for  EU  citizens.  Furthermore, 
Spain declares that due to the recognition 
of this right being a matter that depends on 
the  EU,  only  EU  law  can  make  an 
amendment  to  its  field  of  application 
ratione  personae  [11].  Likewise,  Spain 
refuses the idea that rights that arise from 
EU citizenship can have different fields of 
application,  as  this  would  mean  the 
breaking  up  of  citizenry.  The  Spanish 
government  supports  its  arguments  with 
the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union, in which article 39 refers 
to the citizens of the EU as holders of the 
right to vote and stand as a candidate at 
elections,  understanding  that  this 
expression is not open to a country’s own 
interpretation.  The  Spanish  government 
also  supports  its  argument  through  the 
Treaty  establishing  a  Constitution  for 
Europe, considering that the link between 
the  right  to  vote  in  European  Parliament 
elections and being a EU citizen is clearly 
stated in its articles.  
For the United Kingdom, recognising the 
QCCs’ right to vote is considered part of 
its  constitutional  tradition  and,  supported 
in this sense by the European Commission, 
it understands that the right to active and 
passive suffrage in the European elections 
may be extended to British nationals from 
other countries, since no EU law exists that 
opposes this idea [12]. Thus, the UK states 
that EU law does not have full control over 
the matters relating to the right to active 
and  passive  suffrage  in  the  European 
elections, and that the 1976 Act does not 
define  the  categories  of  who  holds  this 
right, consequently understanding that this 
matter  could  be  regulated  by  the  EPRA 
2003  [13].  Furthermore, the  UK  believes 
that not only EU citizens enjoy the rights 
conferred  by  the  Treaty  of  the  European 
Community  [14],  stating  that  the  Treaty 
establishing  a  Constitution  for  Europe  is 
established  is  not  valid  and  that  its 
regulations  do  not  aim,  at  first  sight,  to 
exclude  those  nationals  from  other 
countries  from  the  right  to  vote,  nor  to 
prescribe the way in which Member States 
must set the requirements for the right to 
vote.   
According  to  the  interpretation  of  the 
ECJ in this matter, in accordance with the 
law in force, the decision of who has the 
right to vote in the European elections is 
the  responsibility  of  each  Member  State, 
while respecting EU law, adding later on 
that the articles of the Treaty referred to by 
Spain in its allegations are not opposed to 
the Member States recognising the right to 
active  and  passive  suffrage  of  certain 
people that have a close tie to them and 
that are not actual nationals of the country 
in question or citizens of the EU that reside 
in their territory.  
The European Court of Justice has stated 
that  the  idea  behind  the  EU’s  statute  of 
citizenship  is  to  turn  it  into  the 
fundamental  statute  of  nationals  of 
Member  States,  allowing  those  that  find Bulletin of the Transilvania University of Braşov • Vol. 2 (51) - 2009 • Series VII 
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themselves in the same situation to obtain, 
regardless of their nationality and without 
affecting the exceptions clearly anticipated 
to this respect, the same legal treatment; a 
statement that, for the Court itself, does not 
necessarily mean that the rights recognised 
by  the  Treaty  are  reserved  only  for  EU 
citizens. 
Finally,  recognising  that  Britain’s 
decision to concede the right of active and 
passive  suffrage  in  the  national  elections 
and in those of the legislative assembly of 
Gibraltar  to  the  QCCs  that  fulfil  certain 
requirements is related to the constitutional 
tradition of the UK, the European Court of 
Justice  understands  that  this  country’s 
decision  to  extrapolate  to  the  European 
elections,  organised  in  Gibraltar,  the 
requirements  established  in  its  national 
regulations  for  being  able  to  vote  or  be 
elected, in those other elections (national 
and  for  the  legislative  assembly  of 
Gibraltar), does not go against EU law.  
As  a  result,  the  European  Court  of 
Justice declares that Spain has not proved 
that the United Kingdom, by adopting the 
EPRA  2003,  has  infringed  the 
aforementioned articles of the Treaty, and 
it considers that the first plea in law put 
forward  by  the  Spanish  government  is 
unfounded.   
 
4.  The  Creation  of  a  Combined 
Constituency  for  the  Territory  of 
Gibraltar 
We will now analyse the second plea in 
law  put  forward  by  the  Spanish 
government, according to which the United 
Kingdom infringed the 1976 Act and the 
commitments made in the aforementioned 
Declaration of the 18th February 2002, by 
creating  a  combined  constituency  for  the 
territory of Gibraltar.  
As  has  been  mentioned,  in  accordance 
with what is set out in Annex I of the 1976 
Act, the United Kingdom cannot apply the 
regulations  of  this  Act  to  Gibraltar  [15]. 
Spain therefore considers that in order to 
ensure the Matthews judgment is complied 
with,  as  well  as  the  terms  of  the 
Declaration of the 18th February 2002, the 
EPRA  2003  should  have  been  limited  to 
assigning  the  Gibraltar  electorate  to  a 
British  constituency.  In  other  words,  the 
United Kingdom should have included the 
Gibraltar  electorate  that  are  British 
nationals  into  an  existing  constituency, 
rather than the territory of Gibraltar as a 
whole,  and  to  have  done  so  without 
involving  the  authorities  in  the  electoral 
proceedings [16]. 
However, the United Kingdom considers 
the  contents  of  the  EPRA  2003  to  be  in 
accordance  with  the  1976  Act,  since  the 
latter should be interpreted in accordance 
with  the  fundamental  rights,  as  is 
recognised and guaranteed in the European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and 
interpreted  by  the  European  Court  of 
Human Rights in the Matthews judgment.  
Furthermore,  the  UK  declares  that  it  has 
respected its commitment to ensure that the 
necessary  alterations  were  introduced  in 
order  to  allow  the  Gibraltar  electorate  to 
participate  in  the  European  Parliament 
elections under the same conditions as the 
electorate of any existing constituency in 
the  United  Kingdom,  extrapolating  its 
legislation  to  Gibraltar  and  adapting  the 
requirements,  mutatis  mutandis,  to  the 
Gibraltar electorate [17]. 
Similarly, the ECJ considers the United 
Kingdom  to  have  acted  in  line  with  the 
Matthews  judgment,  rejecting  Spain’s 
declaration.  Furthermore,  as  regards  the 
inclusion  of  Gibraltar  in  an  existing 
constituency in England, the ECJ reminds 
us  that  by  organising  the  voting  in  this 
way,  the  UK  manages  to  place  the 
Gibraltar  electorate  in  a  situation  that  is 
similar to that of a voter in the UK, without 
having to face obstacles arising from the 
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allow them to use their right to vote, or that 
may dissuade them from doing so.  
In relation to the second plea in law put 
forward  by  the  Spanish  government,  the 
ECJ  declares  that  this  is  also  unfounded 
and  does  not  provide  sufficient 
reasoning[18]. 
Consequently, the ECJ decided to reject 
the  appeal  made  by  the  Spanish 
government  against the  United Kingdom, 
while ordering Spain to pay the costs, and 
that the European Commission pays for its 
own costs.   
 
5. Final Thoughts 
In our opinion, the first plea in law set 
out  by  Spain  in  the  appeal  against  the 
United Kingdom due to a breach of the law 
was  not  appropriately  supported.  Spain 
argues that by EPRA 2003 extending the 
right to vote to non-EU nationals residing 
in Gibraltar (like the QCCs), it has violated 
certain  regulations  of  the  Treaty  of  the 
European  Community  that,  according  to 
our  government,  link  Union  citizenship 
with  the  right  to  active  and  passive 
suffrage  in  the  European  Parliament 
elections.   
However,  we  consider  that  if,  by 
applying  the  Matthews  judgment,  Spain 
accepted the Gibraltarians’ right (as Union 
citizens with British nationality) to vote in 
the European Parliament elections, perhaps 
the Spanish government should have based 
its first cause for appeal on the boundaries 
that can be applied to Annex I of the 1976 
Act, one of them being the recognition of a 
fundamental  right  that  the  QCCs  lack. 
Thus, the extension of the right to vote to 
non-EU  nationals  could  not  constitute  an 
exception to the 1976 Act, since it would 
not have been imposed as a result of the 
need  to  guarantee  the  possibility  of 
exercising a right of this nature.   
Since the subject of the appeal is not the 
organisation  of  the  European  Parliament 
elections  in  the  United  Kingdom,  but 
rather  the  way  in  which  the  UK  has 
organised  the  elections  in  Gibraltar,  we 
understand that the legal basis upon which 
the  accusation  of  violation  of  EU  law 
should be based on Annex I of the 1976 
Act.  This  Act  excludes  the  territory  of 
Gibraltar from the European elections, and 
not the violation of certain regulations of 
the Treaty that affect EU citizens. 
The violation of Annex I of the 1976 Act 
would equally serve as a legal basis upon 
which  the  second  plea  in  law  could  be 
based, meaning that the United Kingdom 
would have violated EU law by creating a 
combined constituency for the territory of 
Gibraltar, without taking into account the 
commitments it made in the Declaration of 
the 18
th February 2002; a Declaration upon 
which the ECJ bases its justification of the 
extrapolation  of  the  UK’s  regulations  to 
the territory of Gibraltar, mutatis mutandis, 
and  the  recognition  of  the  Gibraltar 
electorate’s  right  to  vote  under  the  same 
terms as the electorate in the South West of 
England constituency.  
Also in this case one could have argued 
that  the  unilateral  declaration  of  a  State 
cannot act as an exception to an original 
rule of law (Annex I of the 1976 Act).   
However, the inclusion of the electorate 
and not the territory of Gibraltar (an idea 
upheld by the Spanish government), would 
have guaranteed the EU citizens’ residing 
in Gibraltar right to vote in the European 
elections  (whether  they  were  British  or 
nationals of other EU countries).  Solutions 
do  exist  in  order  to  ensure  such  a 
situation[19]. 
We must not forget that the exclusion of 
Gibraltar  from  the  European  Parliament 
elections  complies  with  its  international 
legal  status.  On  a  constitutional  level, 
Gibraltar does not form part of the territory 
of the United Kingdom.  It is a colony, and 
according to the Act relating to the terms 
of accession of the Kingdom of Denmark, 
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Britain  and  Northern  Ireland,  and  to  the 
adaptations of the Treaties, certain parts of 
the Treaty of the European Community do 
not apply to Gibraltar.  
In  summary,  we  believe  that  if  the 
Spanish appeal before the European Court 
of  Justice  had  focused  more  on  the 
boundaries of Annex I of the 1976 Act, it 
would have led to other arguments before 
the ECJ, which may have given a different 
result to that of this judgment.     
One must not forget that the judgment by 
the ECJ in 2006 has been that which, in 
short, has interpreted the specific electoral 
regulations  established  ad  hoc  for  the 
European  Parliament  elections  and  the 
Declaration between Spain and the UK in 
2002,  thus  allowing  the  British  electoral 
law of 2003 to be applied. And by virtue of 
this  British  law,  the  Gibraltarians 
participated in the  European  elections  on 
the 4th June 2009, the territory of Gibraltar 
having  been  included in  the  constituency 
of the South West of England.  
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(Section 54 of the ECJ judgment). 
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Gibraltar, as is defined in article X of 
the  Treaty  of  Utrecht  and  in  the 
resolution 2625 (XXV) of the General 
Assembly  on  the  24th  October  1970, 
which  states  that  the  territory  of  a 
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distinct from the territory of the State 
administering  it.  Spain  believes  that 
Annex  I  of  the  1976  Act  is  an 
implementation  of  this  principle 
(section 83 of the ECJ judgment). 
16.  The  EPRA  2003  anticipated  the 
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Gibraltar  organised  by  a  local 
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being able to vote in Gibraltar (article 
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Gibraltar’s local legal bodies must also 
be  responsible  for  understanding  the 
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UK’s  regulations  to  the  territory  of 
Gibraltar,  mutatis  mutandis,  is  even 
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seen  in  section  59  of  the  Matthews 
judgment  …,  the  European  Court  of 
Human  Rights  did  not  see,  in 
Gibraltar’s  legal  system,  any  factor 
that expressed local needs that had to 
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article 56, section 3 of the ECHR, for 
the application of this agreement to a 
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are the responsibility of a Contracting 
State” (section 96 of the judgment). 
19.  The  following  statement  by  Ruiz-
Jarabo  is  of  great  interest:  “…  is  it 
feasible  that  EU  citizens  residing  in 
Gibraltar should vote for a parliament 
that does not represent their territory?  
Absolutely.  Once  more,  a  territorial 
matter should not be confused with a 
personal  matter.  Article  190  aims  to 
ensure  the  representation  of  citizens, 
and not territories, in the Parliament… 
In fact, the votes of the Gibraltarians 
could be added to those of an English 
constituency, or even (and why not?) 
to a Spanish constituency. As regards 
the form of the vote, there would not 
be great problems there either: one can 
vote by post, in a polling station set up 
in  the  colony…  Not  only  are  there 
numerous solutions - as highlighted by 
the judgment (referring to that of the 
ECHR  in  the  Matthews  case)  when 
mentioning the States’ wide margin of 
interpretation  for  organising  elections 
– but these have already been put into 
practice  on  other  occasions  with  no 
great  problems”.  See  P.  
RUIZ-JARABO,  “Por  una 
interpretación  pacífica  de  Matthews 
contra  Reino  Unido.  Colonialismo  y 
Derechos  Fundamentales  en 
Gibraltar”,  ADI,  vol.  XVIII  (2002),  
pp. 229-252, specifically, pp. 250-251. 
 
 